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Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man | 
| Author: Dalton Fury
Creator: Col.(r) David Hunt
Publisher: St. Martin's Press
Category: Book
List Price: $25.95
Buy New: $17.13
You Save: $8.82 (34%)
Rating:  50 reviews
Sales Rank: 1793
Media: Hardcover
Edition: 1st
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 352
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.3
Dimensions (in): 9.3 x 6.2 x 1.3
ISBN: 0312384394
Dewey Decimal Number: 958.1047
EAN: 9780312384395
Publication Date: October 6, 2008
Availability: Usually ships in 24 hours
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Product Description
The mission was to kill the most wanted man in the world--an operation of such magnitude that it couldn’t be handled by just any military or intelligence force. The best America had to offer was needed. As such, the task was handed to roughly forty members of America’s supersecret counterterrorist unit formerly known as 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta; more popularly, the elite and mysterious unit Delta Force.
The American generals were flexible. A swatch of hair, a drop of blood, or simply a severed finger wrapped in plastic would be sufficient. Delta's orders were to go into harm's way and prove to the world bin Laden had been terminated.
These Delta warriors had help: a dozen of the British Queen’s elite commandos, another dozen or so Army Green Berets, and six intelligence operatives from the CIA who laid the groundwork by providing cash, guns, bullets, intelligence, and interrogation skills to this clandestine military force. Together, this team waged modern siege of epic proportions against bin Laden and his seemingly impenetrable cave sanctuary burrowed deep inside the Spin Ghar Mountain range in eastern Afghanistan.
Over the years, since the battle ended, scores of news stories have surfaced offering tidbits of information about what actually happened in Tora Bora. Most of it is conjecture and speculation.
This is the real story of the operation, the first eyewitness account of the Battle of Tora Bora, and the first book to detail just how close Delta Force came to capturing bin Laden, how close U.S. bombers and fighter aircraft came to killing him, and exactly why he slipped through our fingers. Lastly, this is an extremely rare inside look at the shadowy world of Delta Force and a detailed account of these warriors in battle.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 45 more reviews...
 Enlightening read that should make you angry. October 7, 2008
41 out of 44 found this review helpful
I thought we'd learned some expensive lessons in Vietnam. Apparently I'm wrong, and the proof of that is the book Kill bin laden (lower case intentional) by Dalton Fury (not the real name) and Col. David Hunt. In Vietnam there was constant interference by Washington in the conducting of operations in the field. I thought we'd learned to turn command of combat operations over to field commanders, define, in advance, the rules of engagement and then step out of the way and let them go. I also thought we'd learned that international borders couldn't always be respected, especially when those borders provide aid and comfort to foreign fighters. This is especially true when the host government knows they are providing cover for these fighters and takes no steps, or weak ones at best, to put an end to that cover. Boy, was I wrong. Wrong, Wrong, Wrong.
Fury was the leader of an elite Delta Force unit inserted into Afghanistan with the sole mission of finding bin laden and then killing him. Not an easy mission but certainly clear enough. No ambiguity here. As Dalton and Hunt point out, not only was there interference from up the chain of command in disallowing mission options, but the Delta Force was paired with Afghan fighters that were very thin in their commitment of finding bin laden. It is a paradox that the mission seemed doomed almost from the start and yet came very close to succeeding. Dalton maintains that they may have come within a few meters of actually killing b. l. The cave the team thought b. l. was in was targeted and successfully bombed. Later, teams searched the area for b.l. body parts but none was ever found. After reading Kill bin laden, one has to wonder whether our leaders really wanted b. l. found and dispensed with.
Kill bin laden is well written. Why shouldn't it be? The man who wrote it was there.
As a veteran, I've never doubted that the U. S. military is the finest in the world. There's not another soldier in the world that can stand toe to toe with the American fighting man. Our combined forces are simply the best. However, it seems clear that even after the hard lessons learned in the past, we seem doomed to repeat the same mistakes over and over. Will we ever learn?
Dalton and Hunt deliver a masterfully written inside story about the failed attempt to get b. l. Kill bin laden is not a partisan read but it is one that should make you angry.
I highly recommend.
Semper Fi
An exceptional, superb, first hand account by the team leader of US Army Special Forces Detachment Delta October 7, 2008
33 out of 38 found this review helpful
It is rare that readers are provided a first hand, accurate, contemporary, non politically constrained account of a major special operation by US Army Special Forces Detachment Delta. Many organizations claim the title, "special operations;" it takes more than a title. Major Dalton Fury's book explains in complete detail what real special operations are about. Readers may pound the book on the table as they learn that Fury, the team leader, was given the mission but not provided the total command dexterity needed to get bin Laden. Higher echelons unexplainably constrained his alternatives. When will we learn? Nevertheless, Fury writes a lucid description of this most special operation. The understandably unanswered question is why were other alternatives requested by Fury not permitted? Our nation is privileged to have leaders, men, and a unit like this in its military. The continued strong relationship between SAS and Delta is obvious. The book is a great read for active and retired military of all ranks and services, civilians, and academic readers alike. It will be a case history for future generations of special operators. Thank you to Major Fury and your team for trying and for writing the book.
 Over-Hyped by Marketing, Excellent for Students of SOF October 15, 2008
31 out of 39 found this review helpful
20081214 DEPARTED AMAZON WITH OUTRAGE OVER THE MANIPULATION OF VOTES.
This book has been very heavily over-sold by the publisher and will disappoint those who are expecting something other than a professional account of a professional mission with all its warts.
This is a very fine first person account with ample detail that I for one found very rewarding and worthy of both my time and money (the book is very reasonably priced). The reader will benefit from first reading the reviews of the books I list at the end--one would never know from this account that Rumsfeld gave the Pakistani's an air corridor to evacuate 3000 Taliban overnight from Tora Bora, that the Navy was certain they killed Bin Laden, or that General Franks refused to put a battalion of Rangers on the back door (the author does tell us of his understanding that President Bush personally ruled that the back door belonged to the "trusted" Pakistanis).
The author tries hard to be nice to intelligence, but his true bottom line is captured in his description of what they had for him:
1) It's winter in Afghanistan
2) Bin Laden can ride a horse
We all know they had more than that--even with a US Senator blowing the fact that we were listening to Bin Laden's cell phones and satellite phones--but the reality is that CIA could meet with the warlords but did not have actual people within the tribes and on the ground as the Pakistani ISI did.
The author also makes clear that it was just as hard to figure out the friendly situation as it was the enemy situation. From where I sit, "total battlefield awareness" is a pipe dream--a fraud--and it's time we started refocusing on humans that can live up to the Gunny Poole "Tiger's Way."
Here I my notes, ending with my conclusions and ten books I recommend in partnership with this one.
Early on the role of snipers, and the possible uses of snipers if we could get bureaucrats and politicians out of the way, impress me.
Small teams with a forward air controller that can go deep and stay for days impress me, very much. Unfortunately, we don't field them often enough (I only have read of use in Colombia, not generally, but SOF operates in over 150 countries so who knows).
Author reinforces the concept of Irregular Warfare as bottom-up thinking in which every person has a say, but takes pains to distinguish this from leadership, with the self-effacing comment that the leaders will decide after the enlisted personnel tell the leaders what they need to know.
Early on he laments to misplacing of the Special Operations "truths," the first one being "Humans are more important than hardware." Today privates are being selected for special operations right out of boot camp, and between private military contractors being allowed to loot the public treasury of both money and skilled manpower, and the complete dismissal of all standards, one can sense the author's thoughts between the lines: DELTA is the last vestige of "true" special forces (although I would include SEALs and some special air).
Air Force air strikes were not great--1 out of 3 hit the target, and the so-called super bomb, the BLU-82, did not explode as advertised.
Bin Laden's "order of battle" was surmised to be an inner circle of Saudis, Yemenis, and Egyptians, with an outer circle of Afghans, Algerians, Jordanians, Chechnyans, and Pakistanis.
Taliban liked to wear black on black...I could not help being reminded of the Viet-Cong.
Terrain blocked our radios. General Clark and others have made it clear that we are not trained, EQUIPPED, or organized for mountain operations, and between this point, and the personal knowledge I have of how few special Chinooks we have that can operate above 12,000 feet--and only because their CWO pilots have learned to fart into the fuel--it's clear the US is not serious about mountain or jungle warfare, and marginally competent as urban warfare.
After seven days they were out of batteries and water.
There was a "surrender" gambit when they got close, the primary purpose being to keep an Afghan warlord between Bin Laden and the Americans.
We still have total disconnect between ground troop use of grids on a map, and Air Force demand for latitude and longitude. The $150 GPS conversion is great, Navy and Air Force still not joint.
Lovely account of how they did a field hire of a seeming gift from heaven, a second translator who spoke English, only to learn later he also spoke Arabic and had been sent as a penetration. Sidebar on Pakistani penetration of the Afghan group they were with.
No mules. Very very tough to resupply in the mountains in winter. Even without loads, four kilometers on one occasion took five hours.
Bin Laden evidently wrote his will on the 14th of December, coincident with his rather desperate sounding call over the radio to all to arm their women and children.
We dropped 1100 "precision" bombs and $550 "dumb" bombs on Tora Bora, plus tens of thousands of rounds of other artillery and ammunition. I am so reminded of Viet-Nam, where what we paid for artillery shells being fired could have bought every Vietnamese a two-story cinderblock house with electricity and running water.
Author concludes that the CIA model of buying warlords DOES NOT WORK for specific objectives.
I learn for the first time that a visit was made to Tora Bora after the fact, a forensic visit. [He know from Bin Laden's later emergence that he did get out.]
The author is scathingly critical of the Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, which has exactly one hit on Tora Bora against thousands of documents visible via the web.
What I learned from this:
DELTA is over-trained and under-utilized.
Conventional Army leaders have no idea how to use special forces in advance of operations or deep behind enemy lines--they simply do not have the mind-set.
CIA paramilitary and some clandestine needs to be transferred into a new Active Measures Command that is the dark and dirty side of Irregular Warfare.
Fine book! See also:
First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
Delta Force: The Army's Elite Counterterrorist Unit
About Face: Odyssey of an American Warrior
Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam
Who the Hell Are We Fighting?: The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars
The Tunnels of Cu Chi
War Without Windows: A True Accout of a a Young Army Officer Trapped in an Intelligence Cover-Up in Vietnam.
 The Decline of Special Forces... October 30, 2008
11 out of 43 found this review helpful
O.K. all these wannabee Special Forces will love this book. It's like all of these Andy McNab Super-Elite-Forces memoirs: Everybody else is stupid, doesn't get it and only a small bunch of Special Forces are clever, know what has to be done and are simply the real deal...
..unfortunately most of these memoirs tell a failure: Iran hostage rescue attempt, Black-Hawk-Down, BravoTwoZero, LoneSurvivor and now this book.
Makes me wonder if a group of disciplined Infantry soldiers instead of these Ray-Ban and Gucci-Equipment pampered bearded old men wouldn't have succeeded instead.
My firm believe: many modern "special forces" soldiers have simply lost the true special forces abilities: making much out of a little, like the SAS in WW II in North Africa.
But Dalton Fury just tells us the decline of Special Forces: they get every shiny equipment they want, they spend all day long in a sophisticated gym and disrespect everybody else.
Given a mission they fail and blame it on others....and an easy operation (so easy a caveman could do it!) like arresting a single old Afghani man in his hut in the mountains of Afghanistan is "one for the book". The best is yet to come: the most difficult part of the operation was done by some Afghan milita forces (opening up a checkpoint). The highly trained and arrogant DELTA operators simply were transported all the way in a truck...but Mr Fury makes us believe that the ride was very, very hard...
Come on, give me a break...
Mr Fury....you fail!!!
Why Delta Failed and OBL was Allowed to Escape Tora Bora October 23, 2008
5 out of 7 found this review helpful
First off, I would like to commend the so called Mr. Fury for writing this book, it took lots of guts and exceptional ethics to write a book that snidely questions high level military decisions and then show the negative impact those decisions had on the Tora Bora battle. Unfortunately, soldiers are taught not to question authority and to keep secrets no matter how bad the infraction or the outcome. However, Fury was obviously furious (his chosen last name speaks for itself) of the numerous military blunders and the blatantly incompetent decisions that ran contrary to everything he learned as a member of one of the most elite fighting forces in the world. Fury seems to either smell a rat in the upper chain of command (including civilian) or was overwhelmed by its incompetence. In any case, Fury confirms from a military point of view how these poor decisions were a detriment to the Tora Bora battle and how they allowed for OBL's escape. In writing this book, Fury correctly decides that a soldier's alliance should be to the country and citizens he serves, not to incompetent senior military and civilian officials who fail to be held accountable for atrocious and erroneous decisions during wartime.
Fury has written an interesting book that "primarily" details Delta Forces 10 day involvement in the Tora Bora battle from December 7th up to the December 16th surrender of only a couple dozen remaining AQ fighters (also includes some of Detla's pre-planning and post assessments). Fury tells us that he is compelled to write this book because of "misinformation" about the Tora Bora battle; however, Fury's story is "basically" in line with much of the mainstream media's reporting including articles in Time (December 2001), Christian Science Monitor (March 2002), Washington Post (April 2002), Newsweek (August 2002), Knight Ridder (October 2002), The Atlantic (October 2004), and the New York Times (September 2005). The primary difference between Fury and the media is that this author estimates 1,500 to 3,000 AQ fighters at the battle while most of the articles estimate 1,000 to 2,000, with most erring to the lower end estimate. In addition, several of the articles had OBL possibly leaving Tora Bora in the first week of December while Fury thinks OBL escaped around December 15th. Lastly, Fury's team actually joins the battle at a relatively late stage and this book does not cover a lot of the critical battle and intelligence information before that time.
Fury's first hand account of the battle provides attention grabbing detail and describes some of the interesting interactions between a highly trained elite fighting unit and the undisciplined pay-as-you-go Afghan hired guns who felt it necessary to give up their positions each day so they can go back to celebrate their Ramadan dinner (iftar) at sunset. If it was not for the disgusting and unacceptable fact that OBL and about 1,000 other AQ's escaped from Tora Bora because of some of these problems, these cultural and communication problems would actually be kind of funny. Unfortunately, OBL's escape from Tora Bora is not a laughing matter; however, this perpetual war was doomed from the beginning and OBL's "miraculous" escape from Tora Bora was assured long before Delta Force showed up there on December 7th. Like Keane and Hamilton claimed in their book about the 9/11 Commission, Fury was set-up to fail, and this is what this book ultimately implies.
Like a good and obedient soldier, Fury only mentions what critics have said are the "three spectacular military blunders" that led to the failure to capture OBL and other AQ leaders:
1. No real American ground troops were provided (there were more journalists in Tora Bora than American soldiers).
2. The US relied on Afghan proxies, many of whom were sympathetic to OBL / AQ, to carry out the critical ground war while relying on American bombing from 30,000 feet.
3. The US relied on Pakistan to seal off the Afghanistan / Pakistan border.
Although this book does not necessarily critique the above decisions, it does show from a military perspective how the many failures at Tora Bora, including OBL's escape, resulted from these dreadful decisions. By the time the Afghanistan war started the Bush Administration was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was OBL and his al-Qaeda organization that was responsible for 3,000 Americans lives, $30+ billion of physical damage, and potentially hundreds of billions of economic loss. For the attack on the significantly under-manned and under-armed Taliban and AQ forces not to have included for the capture or killing of the individuals believed to be responsible for this atrocity should be incomprehensible, especially when these individuals were handed to the US military on a golden platter in the hills of Tora Bora.
Although Fury's book does not break a lot of new ground relating to the above larger picture failures, it does provide some interesting facts that make a rational person think, "what the fu@! were our military and civilian leaders thinking?" Following is some of the new and important information Fury tells us about the Tora Bora battle:
1. Delta Force made several compelling recommendations which could have led to the capture of OBL, all meant to secure the known back door escape route to Pakistan. These recommendations included attacking OBL's position from the rear (south) or dropping mines on the likely escape routes to slow down any potential AQ escapees. All these recommendations were rejected by senior military and civilian officials (Fury feels the decisions may have gone as high as POTUS). According to Fury, it was very rare that Delta's recommendations were not approved by the chain of command, and during his five year tenure, the rejection of the Tora Bora recommendations were his first and only instances.
2. When Fury's Delta team arrived in Afghanistan, there were a couple hundred Army Rangers and another Delta team already in the theater which could have assisted Fury's team in the ground war. However, in what Fury referred to as a "silly deception plan dreamed up by parties unknown," the majority of these soldiers were sent home to try and fool OBL into thinking we were leaving the theater of operation so AQ would let down their guard. According to Fury, "the naivete' of that idea still boggles my mind today, why were we not pouring all available assets into Afghanistan rather than withdrawing our strength. "
3. Fury's team was not provided basic and readily available intelligence information like satellite photos, maps of cave entrances, etc., and the Delta team had to study much of the Tora Bora area from scratch (the CIA helped build many of the cave hideouts and Fury notes that Richard Clarke had these satellite maps in an exercise he conducted in 2000).
4. In the context of being micromanaged by "higher-up," Fury states that Delta was ordered to send "exact" grid coordinates of their teams to various folks in Washington. Maybe I'm reading too much between the lines, but wouldn't Delta's exact grid coordinates have come in very handy for someone trying to escape from Tora Bora?
5. Fury recants the following from Ron Suskind's, "One Percent Doctrine." A senior CIA operative briefing Bush and Cheney displayed satellite imagery to prove Pakistan's military was not yet in place to accomplish the task of cutting off potential AQ escapees and that Pakistan could not be counted on to fulfill their promise of troops to secure the area. According to Suskind, Bush was not completely swayed and The Decider decided to trust Pakistan. Fury was clearly appalled that the back door remained open to AQ.
6. On December 14th Delta requested needed weapons and mortars from Army Rangers stationed at nearby Bagram airbase (80 miles north of Tora Bora), but for reasons that still elude Fury, that request was denied. Finally on December 16th, around the day OBL is expected to have escaped and the remaining AQ surrender, a directive came from Americans at Bagram to ask the Muj general Ali if he would accept a larger foreign presence on the battlefield, not just a few more Special Ops types, but a massive and overt buildup of American military forces. How do you say a day late and a dollar short in Pashto?
7. Fury definitively concludes that OBL was in Tora Bora during the fighting, there is no doubt in his mind. From alleged sightings to the radio intercepts to news reports from various countries to captured AQ prisoners, it was repeatedly confirmed that OBL was there.
Unfortunately, what this book is not clear in telling us is that Mr. Fury's Delta Force unit was actually one of the last teams to join the Tora Bora battle. Following is critical information that Fury does not disclose in his book but is important in understanding the entire dynamics of the Tora Bora battle:
1. Tora Bora was a well-known AQ stronghold, and had drawn some US military fire since the beginning of the Afghanistan war (along with nearby Jalalabad). Many of the Tora Bora bunkers were made with CIA assistance and it was a well known fact that Tora Bora provided an ideal escape route into Pakistan approximately 10 to 20 miles south.
2. In late October, US intelligence reports began noting that AQ fighters and leaders were moving into and around the nearby city of Jalalabad (approx 30 mi's north of Tora Bora). OBL gave a speech in Jalalabad on November 10th, and on November 13th a convoy of several hundred cars and 1,000 or more AQ and Taliban fighters fled to Tora Bora while the US bombed the Jalalabad airport but ignored the huge convoy.
3. On November 16th, the Tora Bora battle begins in earnest, with intensified US bombing of the mountainous stronghold. It's around this time that the two Afghan warlords are first recruited to wage America's ground war and by the end of the month they have gathered about 2,000 fighters.
4. On November 26th 1,200 marines arrive in Kandahar approximately 250 miles southwest of Tora Bora. Beforehand, CIA Deputy Director Hank Crumpton tells General Franks that the back door is open in Tora Bora and that these troops should go there instead, but Franks disagrees.
5. In late November , Indian intelligence, along with several US intelligence officers, confirm that 3 - 5,000 people were flown out of Kundez, approximately 200 miles north of Tora Bora. Although most of these individuals were "suppose" to have been Pakistani "intelligence" operatives trapped in Afghanistan (some speculate that the Pakistani were supporting their friends the Taliban), there is speculation that many Taliban and AQ also escaped on those flights. It is believed that Rumsfeld personally approves these airlifts.
6. During the first week of December, Gary Bernsten, the CIA agent in charge at Tora Bora, makes a formal request for 800 troops to be deployed along the Pakistani border to prevent OBL's escape. Despite military and intelligence officials further warning Franks that the two main Afghan generals in Tora Bora cannot be trusted, Bernsten's request is denied.
7. By December 5th, 4,000 marines have now arrived in Afghanistan under the command of General James Mattis. Mattis is convinced that with these numbers he could have surrounded and sealed off OBL's lair, as well as deploy troops to the most sensitive portions of the largely unpatrolled border with Pakistan. Mattis argued strongly that he should be permitted to proceed to the Tora Bora caves, but he was turned down like everyone else.
The book covers the rest of the Tora Bora battle similarly to many of the other documented accounts of the events, including the "unapproved Delta" cease fire on December 12th, which is believed to have given OBL the breathing room he needed to escape, and the alleged sightings and radio intercepts of OBL over the next several days. Fury counted about 220 dead AQ's and another 52 captured, meaning that about 1,000+ AQ fighters along with OBL escaped the one month US / Mujh onslaught. Most escaped through Tora Bora's back door into Pakistan, the one route everyone knew would be used, including Dalton Fury.
Like the dozens of intelligence failures that led to the September 11th attacks, senior military and civilian officials failed to connect the logical dots at Tora Bora that would have allowed for the capture or killing of "the most" wanted man in the entire world and another 1,000+ of his closest friends. Also similar to the 9/11 attacks, not one single individual has been held accountable for the blatant and predictable failures at Tora Bora that led to OBL's escape. In fact, when the failures of the Tora Bora battle became a topic of the 2004 elections, Tommy Franks and Dick Cheney flat out lied when they said there was no proof Bin Laden was ever in Tora Bora in November / December 2001. I would think that Franks' and Cheney's blatant lies that run counter to Fury's own first hand conclusions are one of the things that motivated him to write this book. Consequently, Gary Bernsten's book "Jawbreaker" has been so heavily redacted that he is suing the CIA for excessive censorship of his book on the war and the Tora Bora battle. It is terrible that we live in a democracy where transparency and accountability can be ignored by a chosen few, but it is refreshing that Dalton Fury has done his part in trying to correct this injustice and to help clarify some of the events and errors of the Tora Bora battle.
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